<resource xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-4" xsi:schemaLocation="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-4 http://schema.datacite.org/meta/kernel-4.1/metadata.xsd"><identifier identifierType="DOI">10.7910/DVN/UINA0X</identifier><creators><creator><creatorName nameType="Personal">Broms, Rasmus</creatorName><givenName>Rasmus</givenName><familyName>Broms</familyName><nameIdentifier nameIdentifierScheme="ORCID">0000-0002-2903-8198</nameIdentifier><affiliation>University of Gothenburg</affiliation></creator></creators><titles><title>Replication Data for: Good Riddance to Bad Government? Institutional Performance Voting in Swedish Municipalities</title></titles><publisher>Harvard Dataverse</publisher><publicationYear>2021</publicationYear><subjects><subject>Social Sciences</subject><subject>Retrospective voting</subject><subject>Institutional quality</subject><subject>Sweden</subject></subjects><contributors><contributor contributorType="ContactPerson"><contributorName nameType="Personal">Broms, Rasmus</contributorName><givenName>Rasmus</givenName><familyName>Broms</familyName><affiliation>University of Gothenburg</affiliation></contributor></contributors><dates><date dateType="Submitted">2021-06-04</date><date dateType="Updated">2021-06-09</date></dates><resourceType resourceTypeGeneral="Dataset"/><sizes><size>5937</size><size>114256</size><size>1488</size></sizes><formats><format>application/x-stata-syntax</format><format>text/tab-separated-values</format><format>text/plain</format></formats><version>1.0</version><rightsList><rights rightsURI="info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess"/><rights rightsURI="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</rights></rightsList><descriptions><description descriptionType="Abstract">Electoral accountability is widely considered an essential component for maintaining the quality of a polity’s institutions. Nevertheless, a growing body of research has found weak or limited support for the notion that voters punish political corruption, a central but partial aspect of institutional quality. In order to capture the full range of institutional dysfunction an electorate should be incentivized to punish, I further the concept of institutional performance voting, that is, voting on institutional quality as a whole. Using a novel dataset on performance audit reports in Swedish municipalities between 2003 and 2014, I find that audit critique is associated with a statistically significant but substantively moderate electoral loss of about a percentage point for mayoral parties, while simultaneously associated with a 14 percentage point decrease in their probability of reelection.</description></descriptions><geoLocations/></resource>