<resource xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-4" xsi:schemaLocation="http://datacite.org/schema/kernel-4 http://schema.datacite.org/meta/kernel-4.1/metadata.xsd"><identifier identifierType="DOI">10.7910/DVN/HOT20S</identifier><creators><creator><creatorName nameType="Personal">Kolcava, Dennis</creatorName><givenName>Dennis</givenName><familyName>Kolcava</familyName><nameIdentifier nameIdentifierScheme="ORCID">000-0002-5511-4094</nameIdentifier><affiliation>ETH Zürich</affiliation></creator></creators><titles><title>Replication Data for: Greenwashing and Public Demand for Government Regulation</title></titles><publisher>Harvard Dataverse</publisher><publicationYear>2022</publicationYear><subjects><subject>Social Sciences</subject><subject>Environmental Politics</subject><subject>Regulation</subject><subject>Survey Experiment</subject></subjects><contributors><contributor contributorType="ContactPerson"><contributorName nameType="Personal">Kolcava, Dennis</contributorName><givenName>Dennis</givenName><familyName>Kolcava</familyName><affiliation>ETH Zürich</affiliation></contributor></contributors><dates><date dateType="Submitted">2022-08-18</date><date dateType="Updated">2022-08-30</date></dates><resourceType resourceTypeGeneral="Dataset"/><sizes><size>237845</size></sizes><formats><format>application/x-7z-compressed</format></formats><version>1.0</version><rightsList><rights rightsURI="info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess"/><rights rightsURI="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</rights></rightsList><descriptions><description descriptionType="Abstract">These files replicate the analysis in Kolcava, D (forthcoming), Greenwashing and Public Demand for Government Regulation, Journal of Public Policy

Environmental governance in many high-income democracies relies to some extent
on self-regulation by the private sector. Yet, this policy mode is contested and proponents of top-down government regulation argue that voluntary corporate
sustainability commitments remain shallow and rarely are more than greenwashing.
I assess to what extent firms’ business conduct is subject to societal checks and
balances, in particular, whether public support for regulation constitutes a control
mechanism of corporate contributions to environmental goods. I rely on an original
survey experiment (N=2112) conducted with a representative sample of the Swiss
voting population. The analysis shows that accusing firms of greenwashing reduces
both citizens’ perceived effectiveness of self-regulation and perceived synergy of corporate profits and environmental protection. However, this attitudinal shift only
translates into modest updates in respondents’ policy preference formation. As a result, short-run shifts in public support for regulation are an unlikely societal control
mechanism of business conduct.</description></descriptions><geoLocations/></resource>