Replication Data for: Second-order Effects or Ideational Rifts? Explaining Outcomes of European Elections in an Era of Populist Politics (doi:10.7910/DVN/TPRQFR)

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Part 1: Document Description
Part 2: Study Description
Part 3: Data Files Description
Part 4: Variable Description
Part 5: Other Study-Related Materials
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Document Description

Citation

Title:

Replication Data for: Second-order Effects or Ideational Rifts? Explaining Outcomes of European Elections in an Era of Populist Politics

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/TPRQFR

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2020-07-22

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Ehin, Piret; Talving, Liisa, 2020, "Replication Data for: Second-order Effects or Ideational Rifts? Explaining Outcomes of European Elections in an Era of Populist Politics", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/TPRQFR, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:/TCVYg+ZGxnfBGqB2z3Hzw== [fileUNF]

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Replication Data for: Second-order Effects or Ideational Rifts? Explaining Outcomes of European Elections in an Era of Populist Politics

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/TPRQFR

Authoring Entity:

Ehin, Piret (University of Tartu)

Talving, Liisa (University of Tartu)

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Access Authority:

Ehin, Piret

Depositor:

Talving, Liisa

Date of Deposit:

2020-07-22

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/TPRQFR

Study Scope

Keywords:

Social Sciences, European Union, Populism, Right-wing extremism, Elections, Voting behavior

Abstract:

This article seeks to enhance our understanding of European Parliament (EP) elections in an era of populist and anti-EU politics. Specifically, it aims to evaluate both the conventional second-order elections theory as well as an alternative approach that regards EP elections as an arena for conflict between liberal-democratic Europeanism and populist, extremist and euroskeptic alternatives. It does so by deriving a series of hypotheses from both approaches and testing these with party-level data from all EU member states in the context of 2019 EP elections. Our results challenge both explanations. Party size is a robust predictor of electoral performance in EP elections, and its effect is moderated by electoral system design. While large parties lost votes across the EU, their losses were more pronounced in countries where national legislatures are elected under plurality or mixed systems. We find no evidence of incumbent losses or electoral cycle effects. Party-level populism, extremism and euroskepticism did not systematically predict electoral performance but party ideology appears to have moderated the effects of incumbency and party size. Incumbency was associated with vote gain among populist and far-right parties but not other parties, and the effect of size also varied across party ideologies. In sum, these results suggest that vote fragmentation in the 2019 EP elections is partly explained by electoral system design, while it was not driven by the desire to punish political incumbents. Populist and far-right parties in power appear to be particularly immune to punishing behavior often associated with EP elections.

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Notes:

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a>

Other Study Description Materials

File Description--f3988011

File: Replication data.tab

  • Number of cases: 192

  • No. of variables per record: 14

  • Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

Notes:

UNF:6:/TCVYg+ZGxnfBGqB2z3Hzw==

Variable Description

List of Variables:

Variables

ID

f3988011 Location:

Summary Statistics: Mean 140.3177083333335; Max. 276.0; Min. 1.0; Valid 192.0; StDev 83.1653125622031;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:wes8IOoO7yx0+HwpOYSCEA==

Party

f3988011 Location:

Variable Format: character

Notes: UNF:6:m7Go1GmMWf13EykXQlgxIQ==

Country

f3988011 Location:

Variable Format: character

Notes: UNF:6:OkPQAqaH/1nccqWB19zg9Q==

Vote % EP

f3988011 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 9.632141510965257; Mean 12.308333333333334; Valid 192.0; Min. 1.0; Max. 54.3

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:X/2jTOnpkWxH6N70Q+tGfw==

Vote % FOE

f3988011 Location:

Summary Statistics: Max. 55.0; Valid 192.0; StDev 10.622166340131242; Min. 2.0; Mean 13.123958333333334

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:cRY0A5uWZf4UQW0+sZah4w==

Difference in vote %

f3988011 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. -33.4; StDev 6.504150574409379; Max. 19.5; Mean -0.8145833333333334; Valid 192.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:TLtUDzZuRySSnuN08YiFvA==

PEE

f3988011 Location:

Summary Statistics: Max. 1.0; Min. 0.0; StDev 0.47075813311645287; Valid 192.0; Mean 0.328125

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:b3WVc2GS8o8L3RYU4b0L3A==

Populist

f3988011 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 0.41087820431164257; Valid 192.0; Min. 0.0; Mean 0.2135416666666666; Max. 1.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:VKw6xriuQ2bSoyW6DstjGw==

Far-right

f3988011 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 0.0; Valid 192.0; StDev 0.3255666961583601; Max. 1.0; Mean 0.1197916666666667;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:lMVRQ8Amz2ImSrrgZqxXOg==

Far-left

f3988011 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 192.0; Mean 0.1145833333333334; StDev 0.3193511637587477; Min. 0.0; Max. 1.0;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:kNIYiLD/R+Fb7C9Sd3cMuQ==

Eurosceptic

f3988011 Location:

Summary Statistics: Mean 0.27083333333333337; Valid 192.0; StDev 0.4455519940552744; Min. 0.0; Max. 1.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:qWPunycDo57JZ6hDG7n05g==

Government

f3988011 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 0.0; Max. 1.0; StDev 0.46257752522273166; Valid 192.0; Mean 0.30729166666666674;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:4a4j3FVAzIeHiBkWoXUszg==

% of cycle completed

f3988011 Location:

Summary Statistics: Max. 100.1; Valid 192.0; Min. 1.9; StDev 30.55165813388556; Mean 48.507255993150686

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:Ryd4LHA4BMV5O1kYb7v4bg==

National electoral cycle PR

f3988011 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 192.0; Mean 0.8229166666666667; Min. 0.0; Max. 1.0; StDev 0.3827372252539761

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:VWzhA8U7gWPgNpme277WmA==

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

Replication do file.do

Notes:

application/x-stata-syntax