Replication Data for: Epistemic Beliefs Predict Misinformation Susceptibility (doi:10.7910/DVN/S4KL5Y)

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Document Description

Citation

Title:

Replication Data for: Epistemic Beliefs Predict Misinformation Susceptibility

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/S4KL5Y

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2026-06-01

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Fort, Kara; Shulman, Hillary; Bond, Robert; Nisbet, Erik; Garrett, R. Kelly, 2026, "Replication Data for: Epistemic Beliefs Predict Misinformation Susceptibility", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/S4KL5Y, Harvard Dataverse, V1

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Replication Data for: Epistemic Beliefs Predict Misinformation Susceptibility

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/S4KL5Y

Authoring Entity:

Fort, Kara (Ohio State University)

Shulman, Hillary (Ohio State University)

Bond, Robert (Ohio State University)

Nisbet, Erik (Ohio State University)

Garrett, R. Kelly (Ohio State University)

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Access Authority:

Garrett, Kelly

Depositor:

Garrett, Kelly

Date of Deposit:

2026-05-29

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/S4KL5Y

Study Scope

Keywords:

Social Sciences, Epistemic Beliefs, Signal Detection Theory, Misperceptions, Misinformation

Abstract:

Abstract: To what extent do individuals’ abilities to discern true from false information depend on their beliefs about the nature of knowledge? Although epistemic beliefs have been linked to misperceptions, they have rarely been treated as central explanatory factors. Instead, prior work has emphasized factors such as cognitive sophistication, motivated reasoning, and the information environment. Across three studies with large, demographically diverse U.S. samples, we assess beliefs about several hundred true and false factual real-world claims selected over several months. We use a signal detection framework to separate discrimination ability from response bias. Epistemic beliefs, including valuing evidence, reliance on intuition, and beliefs about whether truth is political, were consistently associated with both outcomes. These results suggest that belief accuracy reflects not only cognitive or motivational factors, but more fundamental differences in epistemic beliefs, positioning these as a core framework for understanding judgment accuracy and misinformation.

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Notes:

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a>

Other Study Description Materials

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

replication-EpistemicBeliefsMisInfo.zip

Text:

ZIP archive containing the complete replication materials for "Epistemic Beliefs Predict Misinformation Susceptibility," including data, code, and documentation.

Notes:

application/zip