Replication Data for: Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process (doi:10.7910/DVN/BUWZBA)

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Part 1: Document Description
Part 2: Study Description
Part 3: Data Files Description
Part 4: Variable Description
Part 5: Other Study-Related Materials
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Document Description

Citation

Title:

Replication Data for: Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/BUWZBA

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Date of Distribution:

2019-05-24

Version:

1

Bibliographic Citation:

Golder, Sona, 2019, "Replication Data for: Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/BUWZBA, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:8p3+nrMrhJIsX8j6gGRLGQ== [fileUNF]

Study Description

Citation

Title:

Replication Data for: Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process

Identification Number:

doi:10.7910/DVN/BUWZBA

Authoring Entity:

Golder, Sona (Penn State University)

Distributor:

Harvard Dataverse

Access Authority:

Golder, Sona

Depositor:

Golder, Sona

Date of Deposit:

2019-05-24

Holdings Information:

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/BUWZBA

Study Scope

Keywords:

Social Sciences

Abstract:

In parliamentary democracies, the transfer of power from one government to the next is sometimes characterized by long periods of negotiations in which party leaders bargain over the composition and policy objectives of a new cabinet. Although these delays can have substantial political and economic consequences, surprisingly little is known about their determinants. Moreover, the few studies that exist reach contradictory conclusions. In this article, the author examines how factors relating to uncertainty and bargaining complexity influence the duration of the government formation process in 16 West European countries from 1944 to 1998. In line with the article’s theoretical expectations, the author finds that factors increasing uncertainty over the type of cabinet that is acceptable always lead to delays in forming governments but that factors increasing bargaining complexity, such as the number of parties and ideological polarization in the legislature, only do so when there is sufficient uncertainty among political actors. The present analysis helps to resolve the contradictory findings in the literature.

Methodology and Processing

Sources Statement

Data Access

Notes:

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a>

Other Study Description Materials

Related Publications

Citation

Title:

Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process. Comparative Political Studies. 2010. Sona N. Golder. Comparative Political Studies. 43(1): 3-32.

Bibliographic Citation:

Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process. Comparative Political Studies. 2010. Sona N. Golder. Comparative Political Studies. 43(1): 3-32.

File Description--f3436091

File: delay.tab

  • Number of cases: 424

  • No. of variables per record: 15

  • Type of File: text/tab-separated-values

Notes:

UNF:6:8p3+nrMrhJIsX8j6gGRLGQ==

Dataset (Stata) with variables needed for replication

Variable Description

List of Variables:
  • countryname - Name of Country
  • country - code for country
  • cabinet - number identifying each cabinet, country number then cabinet number in order
  • bargainingdays - number of days spent bargaining over new government cabinet
  • datein - date cabinet takes office, YYMMDD
  • dateout - date cabinet leaves office, YYMMDD
  • postelection - 1 if cabinet is first to form after an election, 0 if not
  • nonpartisan - 1 if cabinet is nonpartisan, 0 if not
  • legislative_parties - effective number of parties in legislature
  • inconclusive - number of inconclusinve bargaining rounds
  • cabinetname - name of cabinet, based on PM
  • singleparty_majority - 1 if legislature contains party with majority of seats
  • polarization - level of polarization in legislature
  • continuation - 1 if country has continuation rule, 0 otherwise
  • positive_parl - 1 if new government needs explicit support of legislative majority, 0 if not

Variables

Name of Country

f3436091 Location:

Variable Format: character

Notes: UNF:6:FxO3NLjKqN6IhSDQxDgdzQ==

code for country

f3436091 Location:

Summary Statistics: Mean 8.285377358490567; Valid 424.0; StDev 4.788300690007451; Min. 1.0; Max. 17.0;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:HeJOisHhu15YHhziKJFqOw==

number identifying each cabinet, country number then cabinet number in order

f3436091 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 101.0; Mean 843.6485849056588; Max. 1720.0; StDev 477.4086637712554; Valid 424.0;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:hezTGOWAsDCWj9GPTW16Zw==

number of days spent bargaining over new government cabinet

f3436091 Location:

Summary Statistics: Mean 23.01196172248804; Max. 208.0; Valid 418.0; StDev 29.328002848105506; Min. 0.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:T//eHgXzLRhGtVzA/TGiNA==

date cabinet takes office, YYMMDD

f3436091 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 424.0; Mean 715008.1415094339; StDev 153175.3470053263; Min. 440609.0; Max. 990528.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:ob8bYZMc2y0tTBXvhWSUXA==

date cabinet leaves office, YYMMDD

f3436091 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 451124.0; Max. 990528.0; Mean 722879.0884520883; StDev 148508.23912166222; Valid 407.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:xkksOpqi9mVcYxndJ+tmcQ==

1 if cabinet is first to form after an election, 0 if not

f3436091 Location:

Summary Statistics: Max. 1.0; Valid 424.0; StDev 0.4968117270607196; Mean 0.5613207547169814; Min. 0.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:0t23KmS388nprrSKS8IbBw==

1 if cabinet is nonpartisan, 0 if not

f3436091 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 424.0; Max. 1.0; Min. 0.0; StDev 0.17889690791646573; Mean 0.03301886792452828

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:wDV3Fh0Xk45RPl+yZbEuzw==

effective number of parties in legislature

f3436091 Location:

Summary Statistics: Mean 3.8371807339679753; Min. 1.9900000095367432; Valid 415.0; StDev 1.2490659418728867; Max. 8.399999618530273

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:b544YEJycTgSLqqBxmeLZA==

number of inconclusinve bargaining rounds

f3436091 Location:

Summary Statistics: Min. 0.0; StDev 1.2268763805724945; Valid 421.0; Max. 7.0; Mean 0.6294536817102133

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:W3f54/XFoferrc3RCqpayA==

name of cabinet, based on PM

f3436091 Location:

Variable Format: character

Notes: UNF:6:RckjQugd+TMpE+1LlQQlug==

1 if legislature contains party with majority of seats

f3436091 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 415.0; Max. 1.0; StDev 0.36615120044725274; Mean 0.15903614457831364; Min. 0.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:qOIxjPhmuVALtNll2r/jPQ==

level of polarization in legislature

f3436091 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 398.0; Mean 0.49636330223412956; StDev 0.22384188638780741; Min. 0.1404237002134323; Max. 1.2355550527572632

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:Ezowhj/+vbwsWiLkksfxYQ==

1 if country has continuation rule, 0 otherwise

f3436091 Location:

Summary Statistics: Valid 424.0; Min. 0.0; Mean 0.2429245283018872; StDev 0.4293564748204292; Max. 1.0

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:dmm9xmbordWhfR+GB2gUIw==

1 if new government needs explicit support of legislative majority, 0 if not

f3436091 Location:

Summary Statistics: StDev 0.4901853534299524; Max. 1.0; Valid 424.0; Min. 0.0; Mean 0.3985849056603771;

Variable Format: numeric

Notes: UNF:6:ENk/xh9U5zp1atmRGhD1kw==

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

codebook.pdf

Text:

Codebook describing data

Notes:

application/pdf

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

ReadMe.txt

Text:

Read me file describing other replication files

Notes:

text/plain

Other Study-Related Materials

Label:

results.do

Text:

Do file to replicate results in the CPS article

Notes:

application/x-stata-syntax