Transnational Networks and Interstate Competition: How Support for Nonstate Actors Increases Conflict between States (doi:10.7910/DVN/7A839K)

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Transnational Networks and Interstate Competition: How Support for Nonstate Actors Increases Conflict between States

doi:10.7910/DVN/7A839K

Harvard Dataverse

2026-03-09

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Kinne, Brandon; Juan Tellez; Anya Stewart; Iliyan Iliev; Brandon Derr; Shreya Murthy; Patrick Bernhard, 2026, "Transnational Networks and Interstate Competition: How Support for Nonstate Actors Increases Conflict between States", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/7A839K, Harvard Dataverse, V1

Transnational Networks and Interstate Competition: How Support for Nonstate Actors Increases Conflict between States

doi:10.7910/DVN/7A839K

Kinne, Brandon (University of California, Davis)

Juan Tellez (University of California, Davis)

Anya Stewart (University of California, Davis)

Iliyan Iliev (University of Southern Mississippi)

Brandon Derr (University of Southern Mississippi)

Shreya Murthy (University of California, Davis)

Patrick Bernhard (University of California, Davis)

Harvard Dataverse

Kinne, Brandon

Kinne, Brandon

2026-02-05

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/7A839K

Social Sciences, network analysis, interstate competition, nonstate actors, civil war, rebels, terrorism

Scholars and policymakers alike now view competition between states as the primary threat to international security. Yet, the nontraditional threats that previously defined the global security landscape, such as terrorism and civil war, continue to flourish. Recent interstate conflicts have featured nonstate armed groups as central actors, and governments rely on these groups to extend their interests. This paper examines how government support for foreign nonstate actors affects interstate competition. We conceptualize state-nonstate ties as transnational networks comprised of cooperative relationships between governments and foreign terrorist organizations, rebel groups, militias, and civilian groups. We argue that these transnational networks exacerbate interstate tensions in two ways. First, they increase a state's capacity relative to adversaries, which emboldens the government, increases its bargaining leverage, and leads to increased aggression toward other states. Second, they increase a government's liability for the actions of sponsored groups, which leads to unintended confrontations and retaliatory actions by affected targets. To measure interstate competition, we use high-resolution event data on verbal and material conflict between governments. We incorporate these data into network models that allow transnational ties and interstate conflict to co-evolve, such that states form ties to nonstate actors in response to interstate conflict, and those ties in turn influence conflict probability. We find that both the size and structure of governments' respective transnational networks are associated with an increase in verbal and material conflict. Further, this association is particularly strong for states that lack conventional military strength. These findings suggest that cooperation between governments and nonstate actors is integrally connected to interstate competition.

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