<codeBook xmlns="ddi:codebook:2_5" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="ddi:codebook:2_5 https://ddialliance.org/Specification/DDI-Codebook/2.5/XMLSchema/codebook.xsd" version="2.5"><docDscr><citation><titlStmt><titl>Replication Data for: Epistemic Beliefs Predict Misinformation Susceptibility</titl><IDNo agency="DOI">doi:10.7910/DVN/S4KL5Y</IDNo></titlStmt><distStmt><distrbtr source="archive">Harvard Dataverse</distrbtr><distDate>2026-06-01</distDate></distStmt><verStmt source="archive"><version date="2026-06-02" type="RELEASED">1</version></verStmt><biblCit>Fort, Kara; Shulman, Hillary; Bond, Robert; Nisbet, Erik; Garrett, R. Kelly, 2026, "Replication Data for: Epistemic Beliefs Predict Misinformation Susceptibility", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/S4KL5Y, Harvard Dataverse, V1</biblCit></citation></docDscr><stdyDscr><citation><titlStmt><titl>Replication Data for: Epistemic Beliefs Predict Misinformation Susceptibility</titl><IDNo agency="DOI">doi:10.7910/DVN/S4KL5Y</IDNo></titlStmt><rspStmt><AuthEnty affiliation="Ohio State University">Fort, Kara</AuthEnty><AuthEnty affiliation="Ohio State University">Shulman, Hillary</AuthEnty><AuthEnty affiliation="Ohio State University">Bond, Robert</AuthEnty><AuthEnty affiliation="Ohio State University">Nisbet, Erik</AuthEnty><AuthEnty affiliation="Ohio State University">Garrett, R. Kelly</AuthEnty></rspStmt><prodStmt/><distStmt><distrbtr source="archive">Harvard Dataverse</distrbtr><contact affiliation="Ohio State University" email="garrett.258@osu.edu">Garrett, Kelly</contact><depositr>Garrett, Kelly</depositr><depDate>2026-05-29</depDate></distStmt><holdings URI="https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/S4KL5Y"/></citation><stdyInfo><subject><keyword xml:lang="en">Social Sciences</keyword><keyword>Epistemic Beliefs</keyword><keyword>Signal Detection Theory</keyword><keyword>Misperceptions</keyword><keyword>Misinformation</keyword></subject><abstract>Abstract: To what extent do individuals’ abilities to discern true from false information depend on their beliefs about the nature of knowledge? Although epistemic beliefs have been linked to misperceptions, they have rarely been treated as central explanatory factors. Instead, prior work has emphasized factors such as cognitive sophistication, motivated reasoning, and the information environment. Across three studies with large, demographically diverse U.S. samples, we assess beliefs about several hundred true and false factual real-world claims selected over several months. We use a signal detection framework to separate discrimination ability from response bias. Epistemic beliefs, including valuing evidence, reliance on intuition, and beliefs about whether truth is political, were consistently associated with both outcomes. These results suggest that belief accuracy reflects not only cognitive or motivational factors, but more fundamental differences in epistemic beliefs, positioning these as a core framework for understanding judgment accuracy and misinformation.</abstract><sumDscr/></stdyInfo><method><dataColl><sources/></dataColl><anlyInfo/></method><dataAccs><setAvail/><useStmt/><notes type="DVN:TOU" level="dv">&lt;a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0&lt;/a></notes></dataAccs><othrStdyMat/></stdyDscr><otherMat ID="f13971194" URI="https://dataverse.harvard.edu/api/access/datafile/13971194" level="datafile"><labl>replication-EpistemicBeliefsMisInfo.zip</labl><txt>ZIP archive containing the complete replication materials for "Epistemic Beliefs Predict Misinformation Susceptibility," including data, code, and documentation.</txt><notes level="file" type="DATAVERSE:CONTENTTYPE" subject="Content/MIME Type">application/zip</notes></otherMat></codeBook>