<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><codeBook xmlns="ddi:codebook:2_5" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="ddi:codebook:2_5 https://ddialliance.org/Specification/DDI-Codebook/2.5/XMLSchema/codebook.xsd" version="2.5"><docDscr><citation><titlStmt><titl>Replication Data for "When Do You Get Economists as Policy-Makers?"</titl><IDNo agency="DOI">doi:10.7910/DVN/NVPJK0</IDNo></titlStmt><distStmt><distrbtr source="archive">Harvard Dataverse</distrbtr><distDate>2018-01-10</distDate></distStmt><verStmt source="archive"><version date="2018-05-02" type="RELEASED">2</version></verStmt><biblCit>Hallerberg, Mark; Wehner, Joachim, 2018, "Replication Data for "When Do You Get Economists as Policy-Makers?"", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NVPJK0, Harvard Dataverse, V2</biblCit></citation></docDscr><stdyDscr><citation><titlStmt><titl>Replication Data for "When Do You Get Economists as Policy-Makers?"</titl><IDNo agency="DOI">doi:10.7910/DVN/NVPJK0</IDNo></titlStmt><rspStmt><AuthEnty affiliation="Hertie School of Governance">Hallerberg, Mark</AuthEnty><AuthEnty affiliation="LSE">Wehner, Joachim</AuthEnty></rspStmt><prodStmt/><distStmt><distrbtr source="archive">Harvard Dataverse</distrbtr><contact affiliation="LSE" email="j.h.wehner@lse.ac.uk">Wehner, Joachim</contact><depositr>Wehner, Joachim</depositr><depDate>2017-11-03</depDate></distStmt><holdings URI="https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NVPJK0"/></citation><stdyInfo><subject><keyword xml:lang="en">Social Sciences</keyword><keyword>Financial crisis</keyword><keyword>Finance ministry</keyword><keyword>Central bank</keyword><keyword>Finance</keyword><keyword>Fiscal policy</keyword><keyword>Monetary policy</keyword><keyword>Partisanship</keyword></subject><abstract date="2017-11-03">Stata data and do files to reproduce analysis (Stata 14.2).&#xd;
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Abstract: We analyze when economists become top-level “economic policy-makers,” focusing on financial crises and the partisanship of a country’s leader. We present a new dataset of the educational and occupational background of 1200 political leaders, finance ministers, and central bank governors from 40 developed democracies from 1973 to 2010. We find that left leaders appoint economic policy-makers who are more highly trained in economics and finance ministers who are less likely to have private finance backgrounds but more likely to be former central bankers. Finance ministers appointed during financial crises are less likely to have a financial services background. A leader’s exposure to economics training is also related to appointments. This suggests one crucial mechanism for affecting economic policy is through the selection of certain types of economic policy-makers.</abstract><sumDscr/></stdyInfo><method><dataColl><sources/></dataColl><anlyInfo/></method><dataAccs><setAvail/><useStmt/><notes type="DVN:TOU" level="dv">&lt;a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0&lt;/a></notes></dataAccs><othrStdyMat/></stdyDscr><otherMat ID="f3106377" URI="https://dataverse.harvard.edu/api/access/datafile/3106377" level="datafile"><labl>HW_BJPS_dataverse_dataset_4 january 2018.dta</labl><txt>Stata data</txt><notes level="file" type="DATAVERSE:CONTENTTYPE" subject="Content/MIME Type">application/x-stata</notes></otherMat><otherMat ID="f3106378" URI="https://dataverse.harvard.edu/api/access/datafile/3106378" level="datafile"><labl>HW_BJPS_dataverse_do file_4 january 2018.do</labl><txt>Stata do file</txt><notes level="file" type="DATAVERSE:CONTENTTYPE" subject="Content/MIME Type">application/x-stata-syntax</notes></otherMat></codeBook>