<codeBook xmlns="ddi:codebook:2_5" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="ddi:codebook:2_5 https://ddialliance.org/Specification/DDI-Codebook/2.5/XMLSchema/codebook.xsd" version="2.5"><docDscr><citation><titlStmt><titl>Replication Data for: Greenwashing and Public Demand for Government Regulation</titl><IDNo agency="DOI">doi:10.7910/DVN/HOT20S</IDNo></titlStmt><distStmt><distrbtr source="archive">Harvard Dataverse</distrbtr><distDate>2022-08-30</distDate></distStmt><verStmt source="archive"><version date="2022-08-30" type="RELEASED">1</version></verStmt><biblCit>Kolcava, Dennis, 2022, "Replication Data for: Greenwashing and Public Demand for Government Regulation", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HOT20S, Harvard Dataverse, V1</biblCit></citation></docDscr><stdyDscr><citation><titlStmt><titl>Replication Data for: Greenwashing and Public Demand for Government Regulation</titl><IDNo agency="DOI">doi:10.7910/DVN/HOT20S</IDNo></titlStmt><rspStmt><AuthEnty affiliation="ETH Zürich">Kolcava, Dennis</AuthEnty></rspStmt><prodStmt/><distStmt><distrbtr source="archive">Harvard Dataverse</distrbtr><contact affiliation="ETH Zürich" email="dennis.kolcava@ir.gess.ethz.ch">Kolcava, Dennis</contact><depositr>Kolcava, Dennis</depositr><depDate>2022-08-18</depDate></distStmt><holdings URI="https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HOT20S"/></citation><stdyInfo><subject><keyword xml:lang="en">Social Sciences</keyword><keyword>Environmental Politics</keyword><keyword>Regulation</keyword><keyword>Survey Experiment</keyword></subject><abstract>These files replicate the analysis in Kolcava, D (forthcoming), Greenwashing and Public Demand for Government Regulation, Journal of Public Policy

Environmental governance in many high-income democracies relies to some extent
on self-regulation by the private sector. Yet, this policy mode is contested and proponents of top-down government regulation argue that voluntary corporate
sustainability commitments remain shallow and rarely are more than greenwashing.
I assess to what extent firms’ business conduct is subject to societal checks and
balances, in particular, whether public support for regulation constitutes a control
mechanism of corporate contributions to environmental goods. I rely on an original
survey experiment (N=2112) conducted with a representative sample of the Swiss
voting population. The analysis shows that accusing firms of greenwashing reduces
both citizens’ perceived effectiveness of self-regulation and perceived synergy of corporate profits and environmental protection. However, this attitudinal shift only
translates into modest updates in respondents’ policy preference formation. As a result, short-run shifts in public support for regulation are an unlikely societal control
mechanism of business conduct.</abstract><sumDscr/></stdyInfo><method><dataColl><sources/></dataColl><anlyInfo/></method><dataAccs><setAvail/><useStmt/><notes type="DVN:TOU" level="dv">&lt;a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0&lt;/a></notes></dataAccs><othrStdyMat/></stdyDscr><otherMat ID="f6424737" URI="https://dataverse.harvard.edu/api/access/datafile/6424737" level="datafile"><labl>replication_files.7z</labl><notes level="file" type="DATAVERSE:CONTENTTYPE" subject="Content/MIME Type">application/x-7z-compressed</notes></otherMat></codeBook>