Replication data for: Responding to Criticism: Non-Democratic States and Treaty Reservation Withdrawaldoi:10.7910/DVN/GURSZBHarvard Dataverse2026-02-281Zvobgo, Kelebogile; Shannon, Megan; Eldredge, Cody, 2026, "Replication data for: Responding to Criticism: Non-Democratic States and Treaty Reservation Withdrawal", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/GURSZB, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:uoOLxxeBHn8ATH8QGe9q8A== [fileUNF]Replication data for: Responding to Criticism: Non-Democratic States and Treaty Reservation Withdrawaldoi:10.7910/DVN/GURSZBZvobgo, KelebogileShannon, MeganEldredge, CodyHarvard DataverseEldredge, CodyEldredge, Cody2025-11-22Social SciencesAutocracies, like democracies, use reservations to adjust their treaty commitments. But autocracies receive far greater pressure to withdraw reservations. To what extent is this pressure effective? Statistical analyses and case illustrations reveal that autocracies respond to international pressure differently than democracies: autocracies are more likely to withdraw reservations when facing treaty body reviews and less likely to withdraw reservations in response to peer state objections. We explore possible explanations for this difference. Autocracies may be more responsive to periodic reviews because they are conducted by technical experts from diverse countries, regions, and political regimes, rather than states’ political representatives. Periodic review is an iterative process that gives autocracies time to address domestic opposition to withdrawing reservations. Yet, autocracies may be less likely to withdraw reservations in response to state objections because they see objections, which primarily originate with Western democracies, as biased, hypocritical, and possibly even neocolonial. Objections are also only filed once and may thus not have the sustained impact necessary to prompt reservation withdrawal.<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0">CC0 1.0</a>Zvobgo, Kelebogile, and Megan Shannon and Cody D. Eldredge. 2026. "Responding to Criticism: Autocratic states and treaty reservation withdrawal." Journal of Human Rights. 25(1):1-16.Zvobgo, Kelebogile, and Megan Shannon and Cody D. Eldredge. 2026. "Responding to Criticism: Autocratic states and treaty reservation withdrawal." Journal of Human Rights. 25(1):1-16.Replication_Zvobgo_Shannon_Eldredge.tab8813127text/tab-separated-valuesUNF:6:uoOLxxeBHn8ATH8QGe9q8A==CountryUNF:6:fEfxfn6TGzhHo+Ugy2+yFQ==Correlates of War Country ID Number73061.015070.0269.8393385185887437.02.0460.0920600594065.1350.0UNF:6:TY7eYI5jwpkKQLktCAGIiw==Treaty ID Number.7.015735.09.0585253328913034.98326646419335419.03.072396.055. CERD299233. CAT446677. CRC1894799. CRPD138011717. GENO044. CEDAW85101919. ICESCR43211818. ICCPR1039866. CED219388. CRMW6768UNF:6:c91MiJWWUJseUH5+/ROdQQ==Ratification YearUNF:6:fvkby6IdfdGU2Vqj35CLPw==Article Number1.072396.016.084.013.27386624993488315735.018.329120393391907.UNF:6:dSOL9wGlKJw90HpOow74IQ==Standardized Paragraph Number908.015735.0.351.544504645005132.00.072396.0170.5874357699331UNF:6:qVUBjywAIvW6EoHjcNr0OQ==Provision ID Number302001.0497485.768235629715071.01917002.0740004.0923763.561360527373060.0.UNF:6:tWz8lvrP1BAwCIK4vqAoHg==Article Function15735.072396.0.5.05.05.00.05.022. general purpose or object055. obligation7239666. limitation077. non-derogation099. functioning of treaty body044. treaty mechanics088. accept jurisdiction of treaty body01010. other or unclear033. definition of treaty language011. preamble0UNF:6:eEjQkKCRA1NL3STJaQMPTQ==Reservation1.00.012680258577818928.0.111891208559993820.015735.00.072396.0UNF:6:gszWnpfd5Pw2LlK0PBMenQ==Declaration0.0.0.0746771150268807215735.00.01.072396.00.005608044643350417UNF:6:KHzk8sAugeDRgA5a2IoOfw==Reservation/Declaration Year1253.01992.010.77667225887959686878.01966.02014.01991.7964884277733.UNF:6:d3UB5LST/0N70DfIfCIQOw==Reservation/Declaration Withdrawal1.00.0.0.0030940935963310760.0555388403548551415735.00.072396.0UNF:6:OKbbuLJ+FYyZxZ9z2llqFQ==Reservation Withdrawal15735.00.00.0523569744631319360.01.00.0027487706503157698.72396.0UNF:6:/+SYcil9UAuNKuDpcWr2bQ==Year of Withdrawal2014.08.61807985855495.1977.02005.52003.87587907.0224.0UNF:6:SrDbLgVAijnj+b4fnVHT3Q==Demanding Treaty Provision0.00.380393944416817560.01.0.0.4854870205682278515735.072396.0UNF:6:MDpqSfbd3NxVnI+nk024hA==Non-derogable Treaty Provision0.072396.015735.01.00.03983645505276610.195576175047667720.0.UNF:6:dQXcdQnNculoVD6E6nw1Ng==Judicial Independence0.3103791475296020561973.0-3.28021121025085453.556389570236206.1.39878554786300310.181479172925452526158.0UNF:6:ZNmiC1/BJbEjVk4moa0U/Q==Treaties Equal or Superior0.426326438149588651.00.072396.00.23875628487761715735.0.0.0UNF:6:uxFfkfjp7QJN6D39KBckUw==Strong National Human Rights Institutions70269.0.4.50891527248699115.02.217416878899774317862.00.00.0UNF:6:wbCMoEcZVhQiR8mC3geXdQ==Democracy56409.0-10.02.6666667461395264.7.08051436089627131722.01.344608135039474710.0UNF:6:ysK8hSTCKLRq/viOFjhYsg==Basic Rights Respected22947.00.21106660366058354.6843538284301760.3285032817939725-3.047454833984375.65184.01.331854965944976UNF:6:P5WwMXzyKEgJJjBQ2oBoBg==GDP per capita (ln)4.167228698730469.62520.011.5841083526611337.3570880889892587.5479030427914451.542848805328812725611.0UNF:6:C38f8HWGvioiAKwfQFUp5Q==Population (ln)2.025936546781420315.480627658062159.12168502807617220.99395179748535.70235.015.69032478332519517896.0UNF:6:PEIv834GjE15c9CjL3gvKg==.17390.070741.04.02.1131451350701832.01.00.839227554713931UNF:6:TT2IGYfCEx0EaINVBmJtYQ==Number of State Objections72396.00.0229432565335170520.0.15735.00.023.00.49472514574298476UNF:6:+alOaCV6ovB1shrtPSIC2A==Periodic Review Year0.0021822601585590098.1.00.0466639901282610515729.00.072402.00.0UNF:6:zo0FX4IJ2Ifk7gLi2XWLmg==56409.0-9.00.00473919648787710.394273940912107.10.031722.00.0UNF:6:uv6qp0Z+CbOdKRVlAXpJww==Replication_Zvobgo_Shannon_Eldredge.dotext/x-stata-syntax