Replication Data for: Political Independence, Accountability, and the Quality of Regulatory Decision-Makinghttps://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YLENUIHanretty, ChrisKoop, ChristelHarvard Dataverse2017-01-122017-01-13T05:04:16ZArticle abstract: "Recent decades have seen a considerable increase in delegation to independent regulatory agencies, which has been justified by reference to the superior performance of these bodies relative to government departments. Yet, the hypothesis that more independent regulators do better work has hardly been tested. We examine the link using a comprehensive measure of the quality of work carried out by competition authorities in 30 OECD countries, and new data on the design of these organizations. We find that formal independence has a positive and significant effect on quality. Contrary to expectations, though, formal political accountability does not boost regulatory quality, and there is no evidence that it increases the effect of independence by reducing the risk of slacking. The quality of work is also enhanced by increased staffing, more extensive regulatory powers, and spillover effects of a more capable bureaucratic system". Data: This release contains data from the Global Competition Review. This data is made available for non-commercial purposes only. Social SciencesHanretty, Chris, and Koop, Christel, "Political Independence, Accountability, and the Quality of Regulatory Decision-Making", Comparative Political Studies (forthcoming).2017-01-12Hanretty, Chris2017-01-122004-01-012015-01-01Global Competition Review (2005). Rating Enforcement 2005. London: Law Business Research. Global Competition Review (2006). Rating Enforcement 2006. London: Law Business Research. Global Competition Review (2007). Rating Enforcement 2007. London: Law Business Research. Global Competition Review (2008). Rating Enforcement 2008. London: Law Business Research. Global Competition Review (2011). Rating Enforcement 2011. London: Law Business Research. Global Competition Review (2012). Rating Enforcement 2012. London: Law Business Research. Global Competition Review (2014). Rating Enforcement 2014. London: Law Business Research. Global Competition Review (2015). Rating Enforcement 2015. London: Law Business Research.This data incorporates data from successive editions of the Global Competition Review's "Rating Enforcement". This data is made available for non-commercial uses only. Any use of variables derived from the Global Competition Review's Rating Enforcement ("Rating"; "Rating.l"; "BudgetEUR"; "CompetitionStaff"; "ProportionCompetitionStaff"; "logStaff"; "logExperience") must be approved by the Global Competition Review. To seek approval, email editorial@globalcompetitionreview.com with the subject line "GCR Rating Enforcement data (CPS data repository)".These data may be used for non-commercial research purposes only.