<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><metadata xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns="http://dublincore.org/documents/dcmi-terms/"><dcterms:title>Replication Data for: Good Riddance to Bad Government? Institutional Performance Voting in Swedish Municipalities</dcterms:title><dcterms:identifier>https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/UINA0X</dcterms:identifier><dcterms:creator>Broms, Rasmus</dcterms:creator><dcterms:publisher>Harvard Dataverse</dcterms:publisher><dcterms:issued>2021-06-09</dcterms:issued><dcterms:modified>2021-06-09T14:43:18Z</dcterms:modified><dcterms:description>Electoral accountability is widely considered an essential component for maintaining the quality of a polity’s institutions. Nevertheless, a growing body of research has found weak or limited support for the notion that voters punish political corruption, a central but partial aspect of institutional quality. In order to capture the full range of institutional dysfunction an electorate should be incentivized to punish, I further the concept of institutional performance voting, that is, voting on institutional quality as a whole. Using a novel dataset on performance audit reports in Swedish municipalities between 2003 and 2014, I find that audit critique is associated with a statistically significant but substantively moderate electoral loss of about a percentage point for mayoral parties, while simultaneously associated with a 14 percentage point decrease in their probability of reelection.</dcterms:description><dcterms:subject>Social Sciences</dcterms:subject><dcterms:subject>Retrospective voting</dcterms:subject><dcterms:subject>Institutional quality</dcterms:subject><dcterms:subject>Sweden</dcterms:subject><dcterms:date>2021-06-09</dcterms:date><dcterms:contributor>Broms, Rasmus</dcterms:contributor><dcterms:dateSubmitted>2021-06-04</dcterms:dateSubmitted><dcterms:license>CC0 1.0</dcterms:license></metadata>