Replication Data for: Democratic Subversion: Elite Cooptation and Opposition Fragmentation.https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/R8TUOQArriola, LeonardoDeVaro, JedMeng, AnneHarvard Dataverse2021-07-082021-07-08T10:26:52ZIncumbents in electoral regimes often retain power despite having to regularly compete in multiparty elections. We examine a specific channel through which incumbents can seek to prevent the emergence of a strong opposition that might threaten them in future elections. We present a formal model demonstrating that incumbents can strategically induce opposition fragmentation by appointing some opposition members to ministerial cabinet positions. Opposition politicians who have the opportunity to secure a cabinet position in an incumbent’s government tend to compete for office independently rather than coalescing into broad-based parties or electoral alliances. The model shows that weaker incumbents are more likely to rely on this cooptation strategy. Using original data on presidential elections across African countries in 1990-2016, we show that past cooptation of opposition politicians is associated with a more fragmented opposition field in subsequent elections.Social SciencesArriola, Leonardo, Jed DeVaro, and Anne Meng. 2021. "Democratic Subversion: Elite Cooptation and Opposition Fragmentation." American Political Science Review, 1-15. ​, doi, 10.1017/S0003055421000629, https://doi.org/10.1017/S00030554210006292021-07-08Meng, Anne2021-06-08CC0 1.0