Replication Data for: "Unpacking Compliance and 'Leakages' in International Regimes: The Case of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention"https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KZKJMSCrippa, LorenzoMalesky, EdmundPicci, LucioHarvard Dataverse2026-06-052026-06-05T22:23:10ZStates and non-state organizations often only partially comply with international legal regimes. Such uneven compliance can generate “leakage”—actions that undermine the regime’s intended effects by shifting misconduct to less constrained actors. This paper examines this dynamic in the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ABC), an international regime requiring member states to criminalize bribery of foreign public officials. We test the theory that the ABC’s enforcement led to leakage, as firms from non-signatory countries increased bribery to exploit the constraints imposed on competitors from compliant states. Using a novel global dataset of documented cross-border bribery cases, a new measure of firm competition in foreign markets, and a difference-in-differences research design, we find that foreign bribery declined among firms headquartered in ABC signatories (compliance) but rose among competitor firms from non-signatories operating in the same industries and host countries (leakage). These results provide the first global evidence of both compliance and leakage effects following intensified enforcement of an international anti-corruption regime.Social Sciencesinternational regimesinternational institutionscompliancecorruptiondifference-in-differencesCrippa, Lorenzo, Edmund J. Malesky, Lucio Picci. (2026) "Unpacking Compliance and 'Leakages' in International Regimes: The Case of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention".2026-06-05Crippa, Lorenzo2026-04-19CC0 1.0