<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><metadata xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns="http://dublincore.org/documents/dcmi-terms/"><dcterms:title>Replication Data for: Why Masses Support Democratic Backsliding</dcterms:title><dcterms:identifier>https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JXCCBJ</dcterms:identifier><dcterms:creator>Gidron, Noam</dcterms:creator><dcterms:creator>Margalit, Yotam</dcterms:creator><dcterms:creator>Sheffer, Lior</dcterms:creator><dcterms:creator>Yakir, Itamar</dcterms:creator><dcterms:publisher>Harvard Dataverse</dcterms:publisher><dcterms:issued>2025-02-12</dcterms:issued><dcterms:modified>2025-02-12T21:04:37Z</dcterms:modified><dcterms:description>Concerns over democratic backsliding have proliferated recently, as elected politicians have sought to undermine democratic checks and balances. This study examines the underpinnings of public support for democratic backsliding, delineating five theoretical accounts: personalistic leadership, affective polarization, populism, majoritarianism and entanglement with the law. We test the explanatory power of these accounts within the Israeli context, leveraging panel survey data collected before and after the government announced its plan to curtail the courts. Results suggest that support for the plan is strongly associated with dislike of partisan opponents and attachment to Prime Minister Netanyahu, and more weakly with a majoritarian understanding of democracy and negative experiences with the legal system. Populist attitudes are not associated with support for the government's plan. Our study advances research in the field by disentangling theoretical accounts regarding support for democratic backsliding and testing them with rich panel data that began before the onset of the overhaul drive.</dcterms:description><dcterms:subject>Social Sciences</dcterms:subject><dcterms:subject>Democratic backsliding, Affective polarization, Personalism</dcterms:subject><dcterms:date>2025-02-12</dcterms:date><dcterms:contributor>Yakir, Itamar</dcterms:contributor><dcterms:dateSubmitted>2024-07-06</dcterms:dateSubmitted><dcterms:source>Gidron, N., Sheffer, L., &amp; Mor, G. (2022). The Israel polarization panel dataset, 2019–2021. Electoral Studies, 80, 102512.</dcterms:source><dcterms:source>&lt;br>&lt;/br>
The Israel Democracy Institute, The Viterbi Center, Flash Poll regarding the judicial reforms, 17-27/4/2023 (code: U0118).</dcterms:source><dcterms:source>&lt;br>&lt;/br>
Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. (2022). Labor Force Survey 2022 [Data set]. Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. https://www.cbs.gov.il</dcterms:source><dcterms:source>&lt;br>&lt;/br>
Central Elections Committee. (2022). Results from national elections – by locality [Data set]. The Central Elections Committee for the 25th Knesset. https://votes25.bechirot.gov.il/</dcterms:source><dcterms:rights>This dataset is made available with limited information on how it can be used. You may wish to communicate with the Contact(s) specified before use.</dcterms:rights></metadata>