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We examine a specific channel through which\nincumbents can seek to prevent the emergence of a strong opposition that might\nthreaten them in future elections. We present a formal model demonstrating that\nincumbents can strategically induce opposition fragmentation by appointing some\nopposition members to ministerial cabinet positions. Opposition politicians who have\nthe opportunity to secure a cabinet position in an incumbent’s government tend to\ncompete for office independently rather than coalescing into broad-based parties or\nelectoral alliances. The model shows that weaker incumbents are more likely to rely\non this cooptation strategy. Using original data on presidential elections across\nAfrican countries in 1990-2016, we show that past cooptation of opposition\npoliticians is associated with a more fragmented opposition field in subsequent\nelections."}}]},{"typeName":"subject","multiple":true,"typeClass":"controlledVocabulary","value":["Social Sciences"]},{"typeName":"publication","multiple":true,"typeClass":"compound","value":[{"publicationCitation":{"typeName":"publicationCitation","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"Arriola, Leonardo, Jed DeVaro, and Anne Meng. 2021. \"Democratic Subversion: Elite Cooptation and Opposition Fragmentation.\" American Political Science Review, 1-15. ​"},"publicationIDType":{"typeName":"publicationIDType","multiple":false,"typeClass":"controlledVocabulary","value":"doi"},"publicationIDNumber":{"typeName":"publicationIDNumber","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"10.1017/S0003055421000629"},"publicationURL":{"typeName":"publicationURL","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055421000629"}}]},{"typeName":"depositor","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"Meng, Anne"},{"typeName":"dateOfDeposit","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"2021-06-08"}]},"journal":{"displayName":"Journal Metadata","name":"journal","fields":[{"typeName":"journalVolumeIssue","multiple":true,"typeClass":"compound","value":[{"journalPubDate":{"typeName":"journalPubDate","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"2021-07"}}]},{"typeName":"journalArticleType","multiple":false,"typeClass":"controlledVocabulary","value":"research article"}]}},"files":[{"label":"demo_subv_adm_code.do","restricted":false,"version":1,"datasetVersionId":247829,"dataFile":{"id":4788679,"persistentId":"","filename":"demo_subv_adm_code.do","contentType":"application/x-stata-syntax","friendlyType":"Stata Syntax","filesize":23856,"storageIdentifier":"s3://dvn-cloud:179ed93769d-bf67efea7377","rootDataFileId":-1,"md5":"ce6d5a52e1882a2cc7510a4f7448c85a","checksum":{"type":"MD5","value":"ce6d5a52e1882a2cc7510a4f7448c85a"},"tabularData":false,"creationDate":"2021-06-08","publicationDate":"2021-07-08","fileAccessRequest":false}},{"label":"demo_subv_adm_data.tab","restricted":false,"version":3,"datasetVersionId":247829,"dataFile":{"id":4788678,"persistentId":"","filename":"demo_subv_adm_data.tab","contentType":"text/tab-separated-values","friendlyType":"Tab-Delimited","filesize":36517,"storageIdentifier":"s3://dvn-cloud:179ed93868b-f6a84eba8f38","originalFileFormat":"application/x-stata-14","originalFormatLabel":"Stata 14 Binary","originalFileSize":167545,"originalFileName":"demo_subv_adm_data.dta","UNF":"UNF:6:Nk/xhGPVreurGI55KFcKrQ==","rootDataFileId":-1,"md5":"849beae41767b7d8d121c7488585921d","checksum":{"type":"MD5","value":"849beae41767b7d8d121c7488585921d"},"tabularData":true,"creationDate":"2021-06-08","publicationDate":"2021-07-08","fileAccessRequest":false}},{"label":"Online Appendices.pdf","restricted":false,"version":1,"datasetVersionId":247829,"dataFile":{"id":4790210,"persistentId":"","filename":"Online Appendices.pdf","contentType":"application/pdf","friendlyType":"Adobe PDF","filesize":482105,"storageIdentifier":"s3://dvn-cloud:179f6c89510-647b7d90395a","rootDataFileId":-1,"md5":"53b4a77682c2d7f1f4a5bdabe9b609f9","checksum":{"type":"MD5","value":"53b4a77682c2d7f1f4a5bdabe9b609f9"},"tabularData":false,"creationDate":"2021-06-10","publicationDate":"2021-07-08","fileAccessRequest":false}}],"citation":"Arriola, Leonardo; DeVaro, Jed; Meng, Anne, 2021, \"Replication Data for: Democratic Subversion: Elite Cooptation and Opposition Fragmentation.\", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/R8TUOQ, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:Nk/xhGPVreurGI55KFcKrQ== [fileUNF]"}}