{"dcterms:modified":"2025-04-01","dcterms:creator":"Harvard Dataverse","@type":"ore:ResourceMap","schema:additionalType":"Dataverse OREMap Format v1.0.1","dvcore:generatedBy":{"@type":"schema:SoftwareApplication","schema:name":"Dataverse","schema:version":"6.6 build 1829-192cdc4","schema:url":"https://github.com/iqss/dataverse"},"@id":"https://ec2-52-207-99-79.compute-1.amazonaws.com/api/datasets/export?exporter=OAI_ORE&persistentId=https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HS9J9I","ore:describes":{"citation:keyword":[{"citation:keywordValue":"Colombia"},{"citation:keywordValue":"peace process"},{"citation:keywordValue":"electoral provisions"},{"citation:keywordValue":"political provisions"},{"citation:keywordValue":"concessions"},{"citation:keywordValue":"public opinion"},{"citation:keywordValue":"elite cues"},{"citation:keywordValue":"popular plebiscite"},{"citation:keywordValue":"FARC"}],"citation:dsDescription":{"citation:dsDescriptionValue":"Designing peace agreements that can be signed and sustained can be difficult in civil conflict. Many recent cases of successful settlements include electoral provisions, often for rebel groups to participate as political parties. Engaging the electoral process, however, can also open the peace process to the population at large, potentially derailing a settlement or some of its provisions, perhaps especially those related to politics. In this paper, we examine popular support for peace processes, specific electoral provisions, and potential concessions that provide former rebels with protections, legitimacy, and power. Using a survey experiment in Colombia, we find that the peace process overall is more popular than its electoral provisions, and that rebel endorsement of the provisions further diminishes support. These results contribute to an explanation of why the 2016 Colombian plebiscite on the peace agreement failed and to an understanding of how design matters to agreement effectiveness.","citation:dsDescriptionDate":"2018-07-30"},"citation:datasetContact":{"citation:datasetContactName":"Matanock, Aila","citation:datasetContactAffiliation":"UC-Berkeley","citation:datasetContactEmail":"matanock@gmail.com"},"author":[{"citation:authorName":"Matanock, Aila","citation:authorAffiliation":"UC-Berkeley","authorIdentifierScheme":"ORCID","authorIdentifier":"0000-0002-2472-2644"},{"citation:authorName":"Garbiras-Diaz, Natalia","citation:authorAffiliation":"UC-Berkeley"}],"citation:notesText":"If using these data or referring to these figures, please cite: Matanock, Aila M., and Natalia Garbiras-Díaz. 2018. “Considering concessions: A survey experiment on the Colombian peace process.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 35(5): forthcoming (The raw data itself is available online as noted.)","title":"Considering concessions: A survey experiment on the Colombian peace process (Replication Data)","subject":"Social Sciences","citation:depositor":"Matanock, Aila","dateOfDeposit":"2018-07-30","@id":"https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HS9J9I","@type":["ore:Aggregation","schema:Dataset"],"schema:version":"1.0","schema:name":"Considering concessions: A survey experiment on the Colombian peace process (Replication Data)","schema:dateModified":"Mon Jul 30 17:35:04 UTC 2018","schema:datePublished":"2018-07-30","schema:creativeWorkStatus":"RELEASED","schema:license":"http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0","dvcore:fileTermsOfAccess":{"dvcore:fileRequestAccess":false},"schema:includedInDataCatalog":"Harvard Dataverse","schema:isPartOf":{"schema:name":"Matanock Dataverse","@id":"https://ec2-52-207-99-79.compute-1.amazonaws.com/dataverse/matanock","schema:isPartOf":{"schema:name":"Harvard Dataverse","@id":"https://ec2-52-207-99-79.compute-1.amazonaws.com/dataverse/harvard","schema:description":"<span><span><span><h3>Share, archive, and get credit for your data. 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