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  <identifier identifierType="DOI">10.7910/DVN/V7RQQ4</identifier>
  <creators>
    <creator>
      <creatorName nameType="Personal">Reinsberg, Bernhard</creatorName>
      <givenName>Bernhard</givenName>
      <familyName>Reinsberg</familyName>
      <nameIdentifier nameIdentifierScheme="ORCID" schemeURI="https://orcid.org">https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7382-413X</nameIdentifier>
    </creator>
    <creator>
      <creatorName nameType="Personal">Abouharb, Mohammed</creatorName>
      <givenName>Mohammed</givenName>
      <familyName>Abouharb</familyName>
      <nameIdentifier nameIdentifierScheme="ORCID" schemeURI="https://orcid.org">https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4181-7060</nameIdentifier>
      <affiliation>University College London</affiliation>
    </creator>
  </creators>
  <titles>
    <title>Replication Data for: Painful Reforms, Punished Incumbents: The Politics of Economic Adjustment</title>
  </titles>
  <publisher>Harvard Dataverse</publisher>
  <publicationYear>2026</publicationYear>
  <subjects>
    <subject>Social Sciences</subject>
    <subject>International Monetary Fund</subject>
    <subject>policy reform</subject>
    <subject>blame-shifting</subject>
    <subject>survey experiment</subject>
    <subject>World Values Surveys</subject>
  </subjects>
  <contributors>
    <contributor contributorType="ContactPerson">
      <contributorName nameType="Personal">Reinsberg, Bernhard</contributorName>
      <givenName>Bernhard</givenName>
      <familyName>Reinsberg</familyName>
      <affiliation>University of Glasgow</affiliation>
    </contributor>
  </contributors>
  <dates>
    <date dateType="Submitted">2026-03-30</date>
    <date dateType="Available">2026-03-31</date>
  </dates>
  <resourceType resourceTypeGeneral="Dataset"/>
  <relatedIdentifiers>
    <relatedIdentifier relationType="IsSupplementTo" relatedIdentifierType="DOI">10.1080/17487870.2026.2654637</relatedIdentifier>
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    <format>text/plain</format>
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  <rightsList>
    <rights rightsURI="info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess"/>
    <rights rightsURI="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0" rightsIdentifier="CC0-1.0" rightsIdentifierScheme="SPDX" schemeURI="https://spdx.org/licenses/" xml:lang="en">Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication.</rights>
  </rightsList>
  <descriptions>
    <description descriptionType="Abstract">We investigate the political fallout from economic reform programs and whether incumbent governments can soften the impact using social protection or scapegoating strategies. We test our arguments through a survey experiment in Pakistan and an analysis of World Values Surveys. The Pakistani experiment confirms that emphasizing the negative consequences of reform lowers incumbent support, while attempts to mitigate this backlash are ineffective. The cross-country data show that populations enduring harsher reform programs report lower satisfaction with national leaders. These findings inform economic voting theories in developing countries and policies regarding political backlash from IMF-backed adjustments.</description>
    <description descriptionType="Other">The survey data are available here: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YAM0WX</description>
  </descriptions>
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