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  <identifier identifierType="DOI">10.7910/DVN/UINA0X</identifier>
  <creators>
    <creator>
      <creatorName nameType="Personal">Broms, Rasmus</creatorName>
      <givenName>Rasmus</givenName>
      <familyName>Broms</familyName>
      <nameIdentifier nameIdentifierScheme="ORCID" schemeURI="https://orcid.org">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2903-8198</nameIdentifier>
      <affiliation>University of Gothenburg</affiliation>
    </creator>
  </creators>
  <titles>
    <title>Replication Data for: Good Riddance to Bad Government? Institutional Performance Voting in Swedish Municipalities</title>
  </titles>
  <publisher>Harvard Dataverse</publisher>
  <publicationYear>2021</publicationYear>
  <subjects>
    <subject>Social Sciences</subject>
    <subject>Retrospective voting</subject>
    <subject>Institutional quality</subject>
    <subject>Sweden</subject>
  </subjects>
  <contributors>
    <contributor contributorType="ContactPerson">
      <contributorName nameType="Personal">Broms, Rasmus</contributorName>
      <givenName>Rasmus</givenName>
      <familyName>Broms</familyName>
      <affiliation>University of Gothenburg</affiliation>
    </contributor>
  </contributors>
  <dates>
    <date dateType="Submitted">2021-06-04</date>
    <date dateType="Available">2021-06-09</date>
  </dates>
  <resourceType resourceTypeGeneral="Dataset"/>
  <sizes>
    <size>114256</size>
    <size>5937</size>
    <size>1488</size>
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    <format>text/plain</format>
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  <version>1.0</version>
  <rightsList>
    <rights rightsURI="info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess"/>
    <rights rightsURI="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0" rightsIdentifier="CC0-1.0" rightsIdentifierScheme="SPDX" schemeURI="https://spdx.org/licenses/" xml:lang="en">Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication.</rights>
  </rightsList>
  <descriptions>
    <description descriptionType="Abstract">Electoral accountability is widely considered an essential component for maintaining the quality of a polity’s institutions. Nevertheless, a growing body of research has found weak or limited support for the notion that voters punish political corruption, a central but partial aspect of institutional quality. In order to capture the full range of institutional dysfunction an electorate should be incentivized to punish, I further the concept of institutional performance voting, that is, voting on institutional quality as a whole. Using a novel dataset on performance audit reports in Swedish municipalities between 2003 and 2014, I find that audit critique is associated with a statistically significant but substantively moderate electoral loss of about a percentage point for mayoral parties, while simultaneously associated with a 14 percentage point decrease in their probability of reelection.</description>
  </descriptions>
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