10.7910/DVN/R8TUOQ Arriola, Leonardo Leonardo Arriola University of California, Berkeley DeVaro, Jed Jed DeVaro California State University, East Bay Meng, Anne Anne Meng University of Virginia Harvard Dataverse 2021 Social Sciences Meng, Anne Anne Meng University of Virginia 2021-06-08 2021-07-08 10.1017/S0003055421000629 36517 23856 482105 text/tab-separated-values application/x-stata-syntax application/pdf 1.0 Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication. Incumbents in electoral regimes often retain power despite having to regularly compete in multiparty elections. We examine a specific channel through which incumbents can seek to prevent the emergence of a strong opposition that might threaten them in future elections. We present a formal model demonstrating that incumbents can strategically induce opposition fragmentation by appointing some opposition members to ministerial cabinet positions. Opposition politicians who have the opportunity to secure a cabinet position in an incumbent’s government tend to compete for office independently rather than coalescing into broad-based parties or electoral alliances. The model shows that weaker incumbents are more likely to rely on this cooptation strategy. Using original data on presidential elections across African countries in 1990-2016, we show that past cooptation of opposition politicians is associated with a more fragmented opposition field in subsequent elections.