10.7910/DVN/HS9J9I Matanock, Aila Aila Matanock https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2472-2644 UC-Berkeley Garbiras-Diaz, Natalia Natalia Garbiras-Diaz UC-Berkeley Harvard Dataverse 2018 Social Sciences Colombia peace process electoral provisions political provisions concessions public opinion elite cues popular plebiscite FARC Matanock, Aila Aila Matanock UC-Berkeley 2018-07-30 2018-07-30 10.7910/DVN/HS9J9I/QRJ5LC 10.7910/DVN/HS9J9I/MSOIEI 486841 25337 application/pdf application/x-stata-syntax 1.0 Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication. Designing peace agreements that can be signed and sustained can be difficult in civil conflict. Many recent cases of successful settlements include electoral provisions, often for rebel groups to participate as political parties. Engaging the electoral process, however, can also open the peace process to the population at large, potentially derailing a settlement or some of its provisions, perhaps especially those related to politics. In this paper, we examine popular support for peace processes, specific electoral provisions, and potential concessions that provide former rebels with protections, legitimacy, and power. Using a survey experiment in Colombia, we find that the peace process overall is more popular than its electoral provisions, and that rebel endorsement of the provisions further diminishes support. These results contribute to an explanation of why the 2016 Colombian plebiscite on the peace agreement failed and to an understanding of how design matters to agreement effectiveness. If using these data or referring to these figures, please cite: Matanock, Aila M., and Natalia Garbiras-Díaz. 2018. “Considering concessions: A survey experiment on the Colombian peace process.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 35(5): forthcoming (The raw data itself is available online as noted.)