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  <identifier identifierType="DOI">10.7910/DVN/GRE48Q</identifier>
  <creators>
    <creator>
      <creatorName nameType="Personal">Mandiraci, Berkay</creatorName>
      <givenName>Berkay</givenName>
      <familyName>Mandiraci</familyName>
      <affiliation affiliationIdentifier="https://ror.org/03z9tma90" schemeURI="https://ror.org" affiliationIdentifierScheme="ROR">Boğaziçi University</affiliation>
    </creator>
  </creators>
  <titles>
    <title>Replication Data for: Power Transitions and Middle Power Agency: Global South Mediators in a Fragmenting Global Order – The Turkish Case</title>
  </titles>
  <publisher>Harvard Dataverse</publisher>
  <publicationYear>2026</publicationYear>
  <subjects>
    <subject>Social Sciences</subject>
    <subject>middle powers, conflict mediation, Turkish foreign policy</subject>
  </subjects>
  <contributors>
    <contributor contributorType="ContactPerson">
      <contributorName nameType="Personal">Mandiraci, Berkay</contributorName>
      <givenName>Berkay</givenName>
      <familyName>Mandiraci</familyName>
    </contributor>
  </contributors>
  <dates>
    <date dateType="Submitted">2026-04-28</date>
    <date dateType="Available">2026-06-05</date>
  </dates>
  <resourceType resourceTypeGeneral="Dataset"/>
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    <alternateIdentifier alternateIdentifierType=":unav">0009-0006-1991-9107</alternateIdentifier>
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  <descriptions>
    <description descriptionType="Abstract">Power in the international system is becoming more diffuse. Amid intensifying great power rivalry and the erosion of rules and norms that underpinned much of the post-World War II global order, several countries in the Global South have emerged as more active players on the world stage. This has extended to the realm of conflict mediation. This article explores the macro-level structural factors that may shape changes in these countries’ mediation behavior. It does so by drawing on Power Transition Theory (PTT) as a heuristic lens to assess the structural incentive environment for mediation. The two-level incentive framework developed here attempts to link the velocity of global and regional systemic changes to shifts in middle powers’ mediation behavior. It posits that incentives to mediate are weakest when hierarchies are stable globally and regionally and grow as change accelerates at either level. A quantitative operationalization of structural change and a qualitative review of Türkiye’s mediation engagement probing the framework finds that systemic turbulence may create a more conducive condition for mediation but is not sufficient to explain variation in mediation behavior on its own. PTT’s structural logic is helpful in examining how systemic shifts may reshape the risks, opportunities and incentives for middle power mediation.</description>
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