10.7910/DVN/CA49EU Xiong, Wei Wei Xiong https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1686-6477 Tongji University Zhong, Ninghua Ninghua Zhong Tongji University Wang, Feng Feng Wang Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Zhang, Muyang Muyang Zhang https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8819-146X Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Chen, Bin Bin Chen City University of New York Harvard Dataverse 2021 Social Sciences Zhang, Muyang Muyang Zhang Shanghai University of Finance and Economics 2021-06-08 2021-07-08 2023-06-29 10.1111/PADM.12760 457728 application/vnd.ms-excel 1.1 Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication. The New Public Management (NPM) has achieved many successes in public service delivery, but practitioners frequently observed failures in developing and transitional economies. For instance, China’s public–private partnerships (PPP) since 2014 have failed to transfer risks to the private sector, to involve private skills and expertise, and to reduce local government’s debt. This article claims that PPP failures in China are associated with the contractual type of non-concessions and the contractual choice is influenced by both political opportunism and transaction costs. Utilizing data of PPP projects in China during 2014-2016, we find that more opportunistic bureaucrats seek to increase projects of non-concessions, but transaction costs caused by product complexities hinder governments' reliance on non-concessions. This research extends the core analysis of PPPs in the literature from transaction costs to political opportunism, which widely exists in developing and transitional economies. Thus, our findings partially explain the failure of their NPM practices.