10.7910/DVN/BXZL6P agnihotri, anustubh anustubh agnihotri ashoka university Dasgupta, Aditya Aditya Dasgupta https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5566-3448 University of California, Merced Devesh Kapur Devesh Kapur Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies Harvard Dataverse 2026 Social Sciences Bureaucracy, Transfers, Political Economy, State Capacity Anustubh Agnihotri Anustubh Agnihotri Ashoka University 2025-06-14 2026-03-09 745 27612 506453 713 12187 37951014 32016 2868152 1661 4031 1711 39178142 3578 44240688 39350 40993735 36029423 33231435 46267900 57381 4362354 8900 51350 7147 1352 86983 40224065 1352 145 38207080 840 28916264 108 29788 19143 611 6700 35695394 38918767 33196 38829906 108 8874 26918 4336548 48270 40887208 27292923 11918906 5228 7147 145 879 43367882 580 145 41455886 604 13315 application/octet-stream type/x-r-syntax application/dbf application/octet-stream application/octet-stream image/tiff application/octet-stream application/octet-stream image/tiff application/octet-stream image/tiff image/tiff application/octet-stream image/tiff application/octet-stream image/tiff image/tiff image/tiff image/tiff type/x-r-syntax image/tiff application/octet-stream application/pdf application/dbf image/tiff application/octet-stream image/tiff image/tiff application/prj image/tiff application/octet-stream application/shp application/shx application/shp application/octet-stream text/tab-separated-values application/sbn image/tiff image/tiff application/shp image/tiff application/shx application/octet-stream text/xml image/tiff application/octet-stream image/tiff image/tiff image/tiff application/shx application/dbf application/prj application/octet-stream image/tiff text/tab-separated-values application/prj image/tiff application/sbx text/plain 1.0 Custom terms specific to this dataset This paper investigates how politicians use personnel policy to control, and sometimes corrupt, bureaucratic behavior, focusing on the assignment of bureaucrats to geographical posts. With a matching model, we show that when posts vary in desirability, politicians can use assignments as carrots/sticks to control bureaucrats even when they cannot be fired. The argument is tested with a nationwide survey of Indian officials who regulate/administer land, a lucrative asset and source of political rents in fast-growing countries. With a novel design, we show that officials prefer posts with urban amenities, good staffing, and hometown proximity. These preferences are intense in salary-equivalent terms. Ruling parties pressure officials to bend regulations by strategically assigning them to their preferred posts but threatening transfer should they fail to comply, especially in locations with high corruption potential (volume of rural-to-urban land transactions). The findings highlight bureaucrat assignments as a potent instrument of political control/corruption of bureaucracy. This dataset underwent an independent verification process, complying with the AJPS Verification Policy updated June 2023, which replicated the tables and figures in the primary article. For the supplementary materials, verification was performed solely for the successful execution of the code. The verification process was carried out by the Cornell Center for Social Sciences at Cornell University. <br></br> The associated article has been awarded the Open Materials Badge. Learn more about the Open Practice Badges from the <a href="https://www.cos.io/">Center for Open Science</a>. <br></br> <img src="https://socialsciences.cornell.edu/sites/default/files/2024-04/materials_large_color.png" alt="Open Materials Badge " width="60" height="60"> <br></br> Open Materials Badge