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Hall"},"authorAffiliation":{"typeName":"authorAffiliation","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"Harvard University"}},{"authorName":{"typeName":"authorName","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"Robert J. Franzese, Jr."},"authorAffiliation":{"typeName":"authorAffiliation","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"University of Michigan"}}]},{"typeName":"datasetContact","multiple":true,"typeClass":"compound","value":[{"datasetContactEmail":{"typeName":"datasetContactEmail","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"franzese@umich.edu"}}]},{"typeName":"dsDescription","multiple":true,"typeClass":"compound","value":[{"dsDescriptionValue":{"typeName":"dsDescriptionValue","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"Plans for European Monetary Union are based on the conventional postulate that increasing the independence of the central bank can reduce inflation without any real economic effects. However, the theoretical and empirical bases for this claim rest on models of the economy that make unrealistic information assumptions and omit institutional variables other than the central bank. When the signaling problems between the central bank and other actors in the political economy are considered, we find that the character of wage bargaining conditions the impact of central bank independence by rendering the signals between the bank and the bargainers more or less effective. Greater independence can reduce inflation without major employment effects where bargaining is coordinated, but it brings higher levels of unemployment where bargaining is uncoordinated. Thus, currency unions like the EMU may require higher levels of unemployment to control inflation than their proponents envisage; they will have costs as well as benefits that will be distributed unevenly among and within the member nations based on the changes they induce in the status of the bank and of wage coordination."}}]},{"typeName":"publication","multiple":true,"typeClass":"compound","value":[{"publicationCitation":{"typeName":"publicationCitation","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"Peter A. Hall, Robert J. Franzese, Jr. 1998. \"Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage-Bargaining, and European Monetary Union,\" International Organization 52(3): 505-36. <a href=\"http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/hfcbi.pdf\" target= \"_new\">article available here</a>"}}]},{"typeName":"notesText","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"Subject: null  Type: Awards:  Notes: Gregory Leubbert Award for best published article in comparative politics 1997/98, awarded by Comparative Politics Organized Section of APSA.; Subject: STANDARD DEPOSIT TERMS 1.0  Type: DATAPASS:TERMS:STANDARD:1.0  Notes: This study was deposited under the of the Data-PASS standard deposit terms. A copy of the usage agreement is included in the file section of this study.;"},{"typeName":"productionDate","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"1998"},{"typeName":"distributor","multiple":true,"typeClass":"compound","value":[{"distributorName":{"typeName":"distributorName","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"Robert J. Franzese, Jr."},"distributorURL":{"typeName":"distributorURL","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/"},"distributorLogoURL":{"typeName":"distributorLogoURL","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"http://www.logos.umich.edu/images/m.gif"}}]},{"typeName":"distributionDate","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"2007"},{"typeName":"dateOfDeposit","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"2007"}]}},"files":[{"description":"Data file in multiple original file formats","label":"H&f_cbi2.zip","restricted":false,"version":1,"datasetVersionId":42652,"categories":["1. 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