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We then allow the qualitative dimensions of cooperation to emerge endogenously: agreements can have broad or narrow membership and entail deep or shallow commitments; they can be multilateral or discriminatory; they can be ad hoc or institutionalized. We find that the relationship between the distribution of power and international cooperation is complex: a large leading state forms a narrow coalition of intensive contributors, and builds institutions, while a smaller leading state forms a broader coalition that makes shallow contributions, and is more inclined to multilateralism."},"dsDescriptionDate":{"typeName":"dsDescriptionDate","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"2006-02-11"}}]},{"typeName":"producer","multiple":true,"typeClass":"compound","value":[{"producerName":{"typeName":"producerName","multiple":false,"typeClass":"primitive","value":"Branislav L. 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