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First, armed rebellions are more likely to challenge states that exclude large portions of the population on the basis of ethnic background. Second, when a large number of competing elites share power in a segmented state, the risk of violent infighting increases. Third, incohesive states with a short history of direct rule are more likely to experience secessionist conflicts. Ethnic politics is as powerful and robust in predicting civil wars as is a country’s level of economic development. 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Drawing on a new dataset on Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) that identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to central state power around the world from 1946 through 2005, we analyze outbreaks of armed conflict as the result of competing ethno-nationalist claims to state power. Our findings indicate that representatives of ethnic groups are more likely to initiate conflict with the government (1) the more excluded from state power they are, especially if they have recently lost power, (2) the higher their mobilizational capacity, and (3) the more they have experienced conflict in the past.","label":"WhyGroupsRebel.pdf","restricted":false,"version":1,"datasetVersionId":42589,"categories":["2) Cederman, Wimmer, Min (2010) Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel, World Politics"],"dataFile":{"id":1522962,"persistentId":"doi:10.7910/DVN/0SZMZQ/AA7BMX","pidURL":"https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/0SZMZQ/AA7BMX","filename":"WhyGroupsRebel.pdf","contentType":"application/pdf","friendlyType":"Adobe PDF","filesize":871038,"description":"Much of the quantitative literature on civil wars and ethnic conflict ignores the role of the state or treats it as a mere arena for political competition among ethnic groups. Other studies analyze how the state grants or withholds minority rights and faces ethnic protest and rebellion accordingly, while largely overlooking the ethnic power configurations at the state’s center. Drawing on a new dataset on Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) that identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to central state power around the world from 1946 through 2005, we analyze outbreaks of armed conflict as the result of competing ethno-nationalist claims to state power. 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